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International Capital Flows: 
The “Overborrowing Syndrome” 
Ronald I. McKinnon and Huw Pill 
When undertaking reform and stabilization programs, countries are prone to 
excessive foreign borrowing that ultimately proves unsustainable. This paper 
outlines a model in which short-run deviations from sustainable behavior are 
caused by financial market failure. Because banks fail as efficient information 
conduits between depositors and borrowers, excessively optimistic expecta- 
tions about the success of  the reform are created among domestic residents, 
international investors, and the policy authorities. Initially, improved economic 
performance and large inflows of foreign capital justify such optimism. Only 
later do the sustainability conditions bind so that the economy collapses into a 
recession, financial crisis, and capital flight. 
Recent events in  Mexico have again highlighted the vulnerability to the 
“overborrowing syndrome” of  economies undertaking liberalization programs 
(McKinnon 1993, chap. 10). Financial stabilization and real economic reform 
with NAFTA  membership in prospect stimulated vast inflows of  short-term 
capital-“hot  money”-into  Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Such 
inflows caused a dramatic collapse in domestic private saving (see table 1.1) 
and generated an  ultimately unsustainable credit-driven consumption boom 
that finally collapsed into forced devaluation and financial crisis in December 
1994. The implications of this episode for the real economy are not yet appar- 
ent, They are unlikely to be positive. 
Unfortunately, this phenomenon  is not  unique. Examples abound across 
geographical and temporal dimensions. Memories of the Latin American debt 
crises of  the early 1980s are still reasonably fresh, the most prominent cases 
occurring in the Southern Cone nations-Chile  (see table 1.2),  Argentina, and 
Uruguay. Moreover, the history of South America during the last two centuries 
is punctuated by episodes of excessive borrowing followed by  financial crisis 
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Table 1.1  Savings and the Current Account in Mexico, 1989-93 
(W of GDP, except where stated) 
Inflow Episode 
Average of Three  Year Prior 
Prioryears  toEpisode  Year  1  Year2  Year3  Year4 
Real GDP growth (%)  -0.3  1.2  3.3  4.4  3.6  2.6 
Savings  21.1  21.6  21.5  22.4  21.8  21.9 
Public sector  3.8  0.4  3.2  7.4  6.6  7.3 
Private sector  15.1  17.8  15.5  11.2  10  7.7 
Current account  -0.5  -2.2  -3  -3.2  -4.7  -7.1 
Source: Schadler et al. (1993). 
Table 1.2  Chile’s Overborrowing Experience, 1978-82 (% of GDP) 
1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
Investment  16.5  19.6  23.9  23.9  9.6 
Consumption  72.4  71.1  70.5  76.2  76.1 
Budget deficit  0.8  -1.7  -3.1  -  1.6  2.4 
Current account deficit  7.7  5.7  7.2  14.6  9.4 
GDP growth (% per annum)  8.2  8.3  7.8  5.5  -14.1 
Source: Dornbusch (1985). 
and default. Writing in  1937, the Royal Institute of International Affairs con- 
cluded that “the history of  investment in South America throughout the last 
century has been one of confidence followed by disillusionment, of borrowing 
cycles followed by widespread defaults” (Dornbusch 1985). 
The Southern Cone experiences-especially  the Chilean episode in  1978- 
82-have  become textbook classics (Edwards and Edwards 1987; Bosworth, 
Dornbusch, and Labin 1994). Well-engineered supply-side fiscal and trade re- 
forms undertaken after 1973 had, by  1978, generated enthusiastic expectations 
about lower inflation and increased future income. Facing enormous inflows 
of foreign financial capital during 1978-8 1, however, Chile’s foreign exchange 
and banking systems failed to cope adequately with the problem of disinflat- 
ing. By  1982-83,  exchange overvaluation triggered widespread bankruptcy in 
heavily indebted industry and agriculture causing a severe downturn in na- 
tional product. In addition to devaluing the currency under pressure from capi- 
tal flight, the government was forced to reintervene in the banking system to 
payoff both foreign and domestic depositors. 
Many other liberalizing economies have suffered similar episodes of boom- 
time “overborrowing”--with the domestic banking system being the principal 
intermediary between foreign lenders (depositors) and domestic borrowers- 
followed by financial crisis and bust. Uruguay and Argentina paralleled Chile 
in the late 1970s. Examples are not confined to Latin America. Turkey and Sri 
Lanka suffered in the early 1980s. In December 1993, the International Mone- 9  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
tary Fund (IMF) published Recent Experiences  with Surges in International 
Capital Flows (Schadler et al. 1993). This paper outlined several more recent 
episodes of overborrowing, including Egypt beginning in 1991-92  and Thai- 
land in  1988, as well as Chile (in 1990, following recovery from its earlier 
debacle), Colombia, and Mexico (for summary data of these episodes, see ta- 
ble 1.3).  An updated list might include India, Malaysia, Estonia, and Argentina 
in the 1990s. Even subsequently successful East Asian “tigers” have not been 
immune to such problems. After successful structural and financial reforms in 
1964-65, Korea overborrowed in the late 1960s, lost domestic monetary con- 
trol, and rekindled inflation (McKinnon 1973).  A second and ultimately suc- 
cessful stabilization program was required in the early 1980s to restore Korea’s 
financial stability. 
Even  mature  industrialized  economies  are  vulnerable.  In  Britain,  the 
Thatcher government undertook apparently successful industrial restructuring 
and fiscal consolidation during the early 1980s. However, attempts to disinflate 
by  exchange rate stabilization, beginning with Chancellor Lawson’s famous 
“shadowing of the Deutsche Mark,” touched off a credit-led consumption and 
property market boom in  1988-89  associated with  large inflows of  foreign 
capital through the British banking system. After a crash in asset values and a 
downturn in Britain’s economy in 1990-91, capital flight forced sterling deval- 
uation in  1992-with  Britain leaving the European Exchange Rate Mecha- 
nism. Similar cycles have been observed in Spain (another of the Schadler et 
al. [1993] examples), Sweden (Berg  1994), and the antipodes (Fischer and 
Reisen 1993; Lattimore 1994). Several authors analyzed the European cases in 
terms of  the “Walters critique” (Walters 1986, 1990; Giavazzi and Spaventa 
1990) by highlighting the problems of exchange rate management per se rather 
than by recognizing the magnitude of the international capital flows themselves 
as  a  problem-an  omission corrected by  Pill  (1993). Australia and  New 
Table 1.3  Recent Capital Flows in Selected Countries (billion dollars; % of 
GDP in parentheses) 
Inflow Episode 
Average of Three 
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Zealand suffered from overborrowing in the absence of explicit exchange rate 
pegs, suggesting the problem is broader than the existing exchange manage- 
ment literature has assumed. 
This paper investigates the macroeconomic forces driving the overborrow- 
ing phenomenon, highlighting the interactions among successful real-side re- 
form, flows of international financial capital, and possible market failure in the 
domestic banking  and financial system as it is liberalized. Why have some 
countries embarking on otherwise apparently well-designed stabilization pro- 
grams suffered from the overborrowing syndrome? How did the successful 
East Asian economies (Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore in the 1960s) avoid such 
problems? What lessons do such episodes have for liberalizing economies in 
East Asia and elsewhere? What policy implications come from a systematic 
analysis of the problem? 
Most previous analyses of the overborrowing phenomenon have focused on 
the credibility of the reform program (Mussa 1986; Calvo 1987; Daveri 1991). 
A  belief  that  the  elimination  of  trade  restrictions  on consumer imports  is 
merely temporary may provoke an unsustainable consumption spending spree, 
fueled by excessive borrowing, as domestic residents exploit the “window of 
opportunity” presented by the relaxation of controls. Such excessive borrowing 
will include borrowing from abroad if  the capital account of the balance of 
payments is left open. This “lack of credibility” hypothesis may be consistent 
with the Chilean data from the late 1970s, which shows heavy spending on 
consumer durables combined with a sharp fall in private saving. 
However, overborrowing has  typically financed increased  expenditure on 
nontraded  goods; this would not be precluded  by  the reimposition  of trade 
restrictions in the aftermath of a policy reversal. Moreover, in many cases, the 
industries most dramatically affected by the “boom-bust’’ cycle were construc- 
tion and real estate-the  quintessential nontradable  sectors. Empirical work 
reported  in a recent IMF study (Reinhart  and Vkgh  1993) uses  simulation 
methods to suggest that-for  plausible parameter values-the  magnitude of 
the capital inflows during overborrowing episodes is too great to be explained 
by this lack-of-credibility or “temporariness” hypothesis. Moreover, the most 
prominent explanations of the European Walters critique variant of  the over- 
borrowing phenomenon (Miller and Sutherland 1991; King 1990, 1994) have 
attributed a decisive role to excess, rather than insufficient, credibility-the 
complete opposite of the explanation used for developing nations. 
In the light of such research and observation, this paper focuses on credible 
reform and stabilization programs. In many cases, when they were introduced 
the policies adopted by reformist governments appeared highly credible to in- 
dividuals and firms in the countries in question. Observers seemed genuinely 
enthusiastic about the reforms’ chances of success, generating optimistic ex- 
pectations of future income. In the extensive documentation on Chile in 1978- 
82, a number of prominent Chilean economists have highlighted the prevailing 
mood  of  “triumphalism”  about  the  success  of  the  reform  program  (e.g., 11  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
Schmidt-Hebbel 1987). Political speeches from that period (although hardly 
objective) are laced with the same sentiments: 
[Chile] in ten years will be a developed nation . . .  where 70% of the popula- 
tion have colour TVs. (Labor Minister Jose Piiiera, 1980; reported in Conley 
and Maloney 1995) 
The economy is growing in such a way  that in  eleven years income per 
capita will double in contrast to past circumstances where this would only 
have been achieved after forty-six years. (Economy Minister Sergio de Cas- 
tro, 1980; reported in Conley and Maloney 1995) 
The  reaction  of  the  international capital  markets  and  consequent rapid 
growth of capital inflows were themselves seen as further evidence of the suc- 
cess of the reforms. The way in which capital inflows feed off themselves in a 
self-sustaining cycle is central to our analysis of overborrowing. This feature 
is probably even more apparent in more recent cases, especially in Mexico, 
given the susceptibility of fund managers and other participants in the intema- 
tional capital markets to “emerging markets’ mania.” 
Therefore, for analytical purposes, we start with the premise that real-side 
reform-such  as trade liberalization, utility privatization, or domestic deregu- 
lation-is  fully credible in the eyes of  the private sector. Reforms raise the 
potential productivity of new investment above the levels attainable before the 
reform. To  take advantage of these new  opportunities to increase disposable 
income in the future, at least some economic participants must undertake dis- 
crete new investments that are large relative to their initial endowments. If the 
returns to such investment are certain in real terms, it is easy to design a finan- 
cial system to intermediate funds between borrowers and lenders. In the ab- 
sence of  risk, domestic money and foreign exchange become a “veil”-the 
whole analysis can be collapsed into a simple two-period Fisherian model of 
intertemporal consumption  and  investment.  The  simple  geometry  of  this 
framework, both when the capital account is open and when it is closed, is 
developed below. As intuition would lead one to expect, welfare is unambigu- 
ously raised when it is possible to borrow abroad at a fixed world interest rate. 
This relaxes credit constraints, allowing firms to undertake new  investment 
and households to smooth consumption. Nevertheless, the effect of reform on 
domestic saving remains an interesting issue. 
If the payoff to investing in new technology is uncertain, how financial inter- 
mediaries evaluate risk becomes important. Instead of  a pure model of  real 
borrowing and lending B la Fisher, the precise character of the monetary, credit, 
and foreign exchange regimes must eventually be specified. However, a simple 
extension of the Fisherian model, focusing on the nature of the domestic fi- 
nancial system, is proposed below and offers a limited approach to analyzing 
some of these problems. 
One remarkable feature of the consumption booms associated with overbor- 
rowing  episodes  is  the  surprise  their  existence  and  magnitude  aroused. 12  Ronald I. McKinnon and Huw Pill 
Conventional macroeconomic theory  (as embodied, e.g., in large-scale ma- 
croeconometric models) failed to forecast-and  subsequently has failed to ex- 
plain-either  the nature of  the initial consumption boom or the depth and 
length of the subsequent recession (for a discussion of the British experience, 
see Church, Smith, and Wallis 1994). This failure has prompted considerable 
research into the role of  financial systems in the macroeconomy (Gertler and 
Gilchrist 1992; Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox 1993).  A growing associated mac- 
roeconomic literature suggests that banks are “special” in some economically 
important sense (Bernanke and Blinder 1988). In developing nations (and, to 
a lesser  extent,  in industrialized  economies), they  dominate  domestic bor- 
rowing and lending, especially to small firms and households. Moreover, they 
are often the major conduit for short-term (“hot”) money flows through the 
foreign exchanges. 
As yet, this finance and macroeconomic research has had little impact on 
our understanding of the episodes discussed in this paper (for an exception, 
see Pill 1993). This paper uses a variant of the Fisherian framework (first intro- 
duced by McKinnon 1973). Because of a discontinuity in the production tech- 
nology, the financial system and supply of credit play an important role in de- 
termining real economic outcomes. This allows us to address the role of the 
domestic financial system during overborrowing episodes. 
Because the liabilities of commercial banks are monies or near monies, de- 
posits-both  foreign and domestic-may  be guaranteed by the authorities in 
an attempt to preserve the integrity of  the payments  system. This will give 
private monetary institutions (commercial banks) a strong comparative advan- 
tage as financial intermediaries. The very fact of (often implicit) deposit insur- 
ance (which allows depositors to believe they will be bailed out if the reform 
goes awry) implies that lenders might excessively discount the lower tail of 
possible outcomes of the real-side reforms from the point of view of the econ- 
omy as a whole. Unless otherwise restricted, domestic private saving could fall 
too far, and foreign indebtedness build up too much, in response to a real-side 
reform that increases expected future income and its variance. 
1.1  Some Stylized Facts 
Although we do not claim that these are universally associated with overbor- 
rowing problems, recent surveys of the macroeconomic consequences of large 
capital inflows on recipient countries (Schadler et al. 1993; Fischer and Reisen 
1993) agree that the main distinguishing  features of  an overborrowing epi- 
sode include: 
Rapid growth of domestic credit, largely financed out of capital inflows 
intermediated through the domestic banking system, leading to higher 
levels of domestic consumption 
Widening of any current account deficit on the balance of payments, as 13  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
greater availability of  financing from abroad eases the external con- 
straint 
Weaker domestic monetary control and rising or sustained high domes- 
tic price injution, typically associated with problems in attempting to 
sterilize the capital inflows 
Appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate,  appropriately defined, with 
higher inflation concentrated in the nontradable goods sector; prices of 
domestic assets, especially real estate or house prices, typically increase 
A large proportion of the capital inflow in the form of overseas deposits 
placed with the domestic banking  system,  increasing pressure on the 
government to broaden the base of insured deposits 
Greater vulnerability to adverse shocks and increased likelihood that 
the stabilization program will be derailed and thrown into reverse 
Culmination in  a jinancial  crisis, capital jlight, and  recession,  often 
forcing an uncontrolled, deep devaluation of the currency, with a resur- 
gence of inflation 
A recurrent theme of  the Schadler et al. (1993) paper is the correlation of 
fiscal consolidation with the capital inflow surge (see table 1.4). One would 
generally expect independent implementation of  such policies to reduce in- 
flows of capital as the total public borrowing requirement falls and less public 
debt is sold abroad. Instead, fiscal consolidation apparently acts as a signal to 
international investors that the overall reform program is credible-as  if  the 
government was  indeed getting the order of  economic liberalization “right” 
(McKinnon  1982, 1993). As such, it is a stimulus to the capital inflows we 
discuss below. Pill (1993) discusses why fiscal consolidation may be a neces- 
sary precondition for large capital inflows to occur. 
Note that under the temporariness hypothesis, it is hard to understand why 
an improvement in the public finances is a precondition for overborrowing. 
Often, one associates fiscal deficits with government borrowing abroad. In- 
stead, fiscal consolidation would seem to signal the commitment of the policy 
authorities and thus add to the credibility of the reform program, rather than 
suggest that it will be abandoned in the future. This further justifies our focus 
on credible policy programs. 
1.2  The Simple Fisherian Two-Period Model 
The simple structural framework presented in this section extends the Fish- 
erian two-period model of  intertemporal investment and consumption intro- 
duced by McKinnon (1973), as refined by Krugman (1979). The central feature 
of this model is the existence of two potential production technologies-a  “tra- 
ditional” production process, f(.),  which exhibits decreasing returns to scale 
over all possible levels of production, and a “modern” production technology, 
g(.), which has increasing returns over some range but requires a large initial 14  Ronald I. McKinnon and Huw Pill 
Table 1.4  Fiscal Policy during a Capital Inflow Episode 
(government surplus as % of GDP) 
Inflow Episode 
Country  Average of Three  Year Prior 
(Year of Episode)  Prior Years  toEpisode  Year 1  Year2  Year3  Year4 
Chile ( 1990)  2.8  5.3  3.8  2.3  3.2  - 
Colombia (1991)  -  1.5  -0.6  -0.2  -0.4  -  - 
Egypt (1991)  -  16  -17.2  -5  -  -  - 
Mexico ( 1989) 
Operational balance  -  1.4  -4.5  -1.7  2.6  2.3  3.3 
Primary balance  4.4  6  8.1  7.8  5.5  5.6 
Thailand (1988)  -4.2  -1.6  1.3  4.1  4.7  3.9 
Spain (1987)  -6.2  -6  -3.1  -3.3  -2.8  -4 
Source: Schadler et al. (1993). 
fixed investment, F. The former mode of production has existed for a long time 
so that no major start-up investments are required. In contrast, adopting the 
postreform  technology  does require major investment or reequipment deci- 
sions. Although the new technology is potentially more productive, access to 
credit is required to overcome the indivisibility in the production process im- 
plied by the start-up cost. Credit plays an important role in the determination 
of real output by overcoming technological indivisibilities. 
The economy consists of a large number (N)  of identical, risk-neutral firm- 
households. These are free to choose between adopting the new technology or 
retaining traditional manufacturing methods. They maximize utility-repre- 
sented by a utility function U(c,,  c,)-with  respect to the available production 
techniques  and  an  initial  endowment  (m), taking  prices  (the  real  interest 
rate, r)  as given. We assume a single composite commodity good that is freely 
traded with the rest of the world. In this context, it is plausible to believe that 
the utility function of all firm-households is homothetic over consumption in 
each period. Because all firm-households are identical and have the same op- 
portunity set, in equilibrium they must all achieve the same level of utility. 
Initially, we assume a world of perfect certainty. In this world, the role of 
the financial system is passive-complications  introduced by the detailed in- 
stitutional  structure of  the  financial mechanism can  safely be  ignored. Al- 
though credit plays an important role in the solution to the model by overcom- 
ing indivisibilities in investment, the way credit is intermediated is initially of 
little importance. Later, uncertainty is introduced into the model, and the struc- 
ture of the financial system then plays a central role. 
Exploiting the simple Fisherian two-period framework generates two sig- 
nificant practical advantages. First, the solution to the model can be illustrated 
by  straightforward geometry, relegating the detailed algebraic solution to an 
appendix. Second, the optimization  problem facing firm-households can be 
conveniently split into two parts:  an  investment decision, maximizing  firm 
wealth (value) subject to technological constraints and the real interest rate, 15  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
and a consumption decision, maximizing utility for given wealth and the same 
real interest rate. 
The government undertakes a reform of the real economy. Typically, a liber- 
alization of the current account of the balance of payments, with the abolition 
of tariffs and other trade restrictions, is the starting point. Other potential re- 
forms include privatization,  deregulation, and  domestic structural reforms, 
such as weakening of trade union powers through labor legislation. Measures 
of  this type are common to all the liberalization and stabilization programs 
discussed in the introduction to the paper. These reforms are modeled analyti- 
cally as follows. Prior to liberalization, all firm-households were constrained 
to use the traditional production technique,f( *)  in figure 1.1. The reform allows 
access to the “modern” technology described above,’ as represented by g(.) in 
figure 1.1. 
Should this structural reform be undertaken in the presence of administrative 
controls on the cross-border movement of  financial capital? If  so, what form 
should these controls take? Drawing on earlier work (Pill 1993), we initially 
characterize two polar states for the economy: the domestically  liberalized 
economy (DLE) and the internationally liberalized economy (ILE). In the for- 
mer, inflows of international capital are not permitted and all domestic invest- 
ment must be financed out of domestic saving. In the latter, domestic residents 
are free to borrow as they wish from a perfectly elastic pool of international 
capital at a constant world interest rate (r*). 
The subsequent sections solve our simple intertemporal model in these two 
environments using a geometric approach. A formal algebraic derivation is 
presented in appendix A. A useful benchmark for comparison is the prereform 
equilibrium, which, following McKinnon (1973), we call the fznancially re- 
pressed economy (FRE). If all firm-households are confined to the same tradi- 
tional technology, no capital market will exist. Because preferences and en- 
dowments are identical (by assumption), all households will make the same 
consumption and production decisions; if one wishes to borrow, they all would 
and there would be no supply of savings to lend. Thus households maximize 
utility with respect to the production opportunity set defined by the traditional 
technology, with production equal to consumption in each period. Both pro- 
duction and consumption occur at Q“”  = CF” in figure 1.1. 
1.3  Domestically Liberalized Economy 
In order to exploit the new technological possibilities introduced by the re- 
form process, however, suppose now that firm-households may borrow in the 
first period to cover the initial fixed investment while maintaining positive con- 
1. This is consistent with the large endogenous growth literature (eg,  Romer  1990), which 
formally demonstrates Adam Smith’s proposition that “specialization is limited by the size of the 
market.” Once access to the large (possibly perfectly elastic) world market is attained, entrepre- 
neurs can invest in modem  techniques rather than the “small-scale” traditional modes of  pro- 
duction. 16  Ronald 1.  McKinnon and Huw Pill 
Fig. 1.1  Financially repressed economy 
sumption. Financial intermediaries are able to raise funds from those domestic 
firms that continue to employ traditional production techniques and can thus 
extend credit to other firms that wish to make discrete investments in the mod- 
ern, postreform technology. 
Two conditions  must be  satisfied in equilibrium.  First, because  all firm- 
households  are identical, they must achieve the same utility  level (Krugman 
1979). All households  must have the same consumption  opportunity  set, as 
defined by their intertemporal budget constraint. The constraint is defined by 
a line tangent to the production function, with slope reflecting the real interest 
rate (see fig. 1.2). With firm-households confined to using one or other of  the 
production technologies, the budget constraint must simultaneously be tangent 
to both production functions. Therefore, the slope of the constraint-and  thus 
the equilibrium real interest rate, rDLE-is  entirely determined by technological 
factors: the  gap in average productivity  between  the postreform  investment 
technology and the traditional one. 
With the real interest rate determined in this manner, firm-households con- 
tinuing to use the traditional technology will choose to produce at point QPE, 
where real income is maximized. They consume at point CDLE.  This implies 
consumption cPLE  out of production income x:,  the difference being saved as 
deposits with the banking system. In effect, the higher postreform interest rate 
induces these firm-households to invest less in the traditional technology  in 
order to support lending in the capital market. 
Firm-households  exploiting  the modem, postreform  technology  also con- 17  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
c2  t 
Fig. 1.2  Domestically liberalized economy 
sume at  CDLE-the  identical consumption profiles imply a common level of 
utility. However, their intertemporal income-maximizing production decision 
involves producing at QELE,  implying a potentially negative cash flow (endow- 
ment less consumption and real investment) in the first period ($').  Therefore, 
firm-households employing the modem technology must borrow cpLE -  xy in 
the first period from the domestic banking system. 
Second, the credit market must clear. As we have seen, the real interest rate 
is technologically determined and thus cannot vary to clear the market. Only 
changes in the proportion of firm-households that continue with the traditional 
technology (and thus save) and the proportion that adopt the modern technique 
(and thus borrow) can be the equilibrating mechanism. Therefore, the credit- 
market-clearing  condition, N,(cpLE -  xf")  = N,(xf  -  cp""),  will  determine 
how many firm-households adopt the modem technology (N,)  and how many 
continue to use traditional techniques (NT). 
Since income and substitution effects counteract each other, the relationship 
between first-period consumption in the DLE and that which would obtain in 
the absence of trade reform is unclear. In figure 1.2, first-period consumption 
in the DLE is arbitrarily drawn to be identical to that in the FRE; slight changes 
in the nature of technology or preferences could move the DLE consumption 
equilibrium  in either direction. However, consumption in the second period 
will be much higher in the DLE because of the higher productivity of the new 
technology. With indivisibilities in the postreform technology, one cannot draw 
unambiguous conclusions about the behavior of current savings when liberal- 
ization occufs. This contrasts with the conclusion reached by Conley and Ma- 
loney (1995), who showed that, in the absence of technological indivisibilities, 18  Ronald I. McKinnon and Huw Pill 
reform would necessarily lower current domestic  saving. Nevertheless, over 
the two periods, the reform produces an unambiguous improvement in welfare 
as the opportunity set expands in the DLE. 
1.4  Internationally Liberalized Economy 
Once restrictions  on the capital account of  the balance of  payments have 
been abolished, domestic residents are able to borrow freely from the perfectly 
elastic international capital market. In equilibrium, the domestic real interest 
rate must equal the exogenous world real interest rate (r* in fig. 1.3). This is 
the meaningful definition of perfect capital market integration (Frankel 1992). 
Using foreign savings intermediated through the domestic financial system, all 
domestic firm-households now choose to borrow so as to adopt the modem 
production  process, producing at QILE,  where intertemporal  real  income is 
maximized (see fig. 1.3). Not only does welfare improve relative to that obtain- 
able prior to the initiation  of the real-side  reform, but it is unambiguously 
greater than that attainable in the DLE-where  capital controls constrain the 
expansion of the consumption opportunity set even as trade is liberalized (this 
is an issue to which we return later; it is illustrated in fig. 1.6). 
In the ILE, consumption occurs at CLE.  Even starting with a very low or 
"repressed" implicit deposit rate in the prereform era at cFm, figure 1.3 shows 
that consumption in the first period, c:~~,  becomes higher because of the domi- 
nant income effect. Current saving falls relative to that in the prereform era.* 
Given the higher permanent income available to them following the successful 
implementation of structural real reform, domestic residents borrow from the 
perfectly elastic capital market in order to smooth their consumption. More- 
over, current savings in the ILE are unambiguously  lower than in the DLE 
equilibrium (again  because  substitution  and  income effects reinforce each 
other). 
The counterpart of the capital inflow needed to finance domestic borrowing 
is a current account deficit, CA = -N (ciLE -  xiLE)  in figure 1.3. The country 
consumes more than it has produced in the first period. Sustainability of  the 
balance of payments in this certain world is guaranteed by the subsequent trade 
surplus in the second period, N (xy -  ckLE)-the  investment in modern tech- 
nology pays off in the second period, allowing future production to exceed con- 
sumption. 
In a world of complete certainty, the advantage of liberalizing the capital 
account of  the balance of payments prior to, or concurrently with, the imple- 
mentation of a real-side reform is clear. A fall in domestic saving in response 
to a trade reform is likely to be intertemporally optimal. Households should 
2. Even if, in the repressed state, the domestic interest rate had (accidentally) been at the interna- 
tional level, the income effect of  economic reform would still dominate: current consumption 
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Fig. 1.3  Internationally liberalized economy 
consume more in the first period in order to smooth their intertemporal con- 
sumption path given a higher level of permanent income. 
In contrast, in the DLE-where  all investment is domestically financed- 
any incipient fall in saving drives up real interest rates and “crowds out” some 
new investment, while limiting current consumption. However, in the ILE, the 
fall in domestic saving is met by inflows of international capital that can main- 
tain the new higher level of investment. Extensive borrowing from the rest of 
the world is the optimal solution-overborrowing  cannot arise. 
1.5  Introducing Uncertainty and an Explicit Financial System 
In  order to  introduce  the possibility  of  overborrowing,  we now  relax the 
assumption of perfect certainty. This immediately introduces an active role for 
the domestic financial system. We first describe how uncertainty is modeled 
within our Fisherian analytical framework and then describe the institutional 
nature of the financial system. 
Uncertainty is introduced by making the productivity of the modem produc- 
tion technique a random variable (the modem technology production function 
becomes g’(.) = (a  +  E)  g(.),  where a and E are orthogonal). The variability of a 
represents macroeconomic risk-the  uncertainty about how successful the im- 
plementation of real-side reform will be. It is assumed that the number of firm- 
households is sufficiently large and their experience is sufficiently diverse that 
any firm-specific idiosyncratic risk 8  can be eliminated by efficient risk manage- 
ment of  the banks’ asset portfolio. Firm-specific risk is ignored in what fol- 
lows. The banking system faces only irreducible “market” or macroeconomic 
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The domestic capital market is viewed as  synonymous with  indigenous 
deposit-taking commercial banks. The implications of relaxing this assumption 
are discussed below. Subsequently, we show that, in the presence of  certain 
common market interventions by the authorities, the banks may enjoy a com- 
parative advantage that allows them to dominate alternative financial interme- 
diaries. The preeminent role of the banking system as a conduit for hot money 
flows-one  of the stylized facts of  overborrowing episodes noted above-is 
thus endogenous to our framework. 
Uncertainty is resolved in two stages. At the beginning of the first period, a 
value  ;-representing  privileged  prior  knowledge  about  the  productivity 
shock-is  drawn from a probability distribution, H,(ci). The outcome of this 
drawing is known to the banks, but all other economic actors in this econ- 
omy-the  government, the domestic firm-households, and  overseas invest- 
ors-only  know the distribution function from which it is drawn. At the begin- 
ning of  the second period, the value of a-the  productivity shock itself-is 
realized. This information is common knowledge. The final realization of a is 
drawn from a distribution H,(a) with mean 6. 
This framework gives the banks an informational advantage. They have extra 
information about the likely final realization of a when consumption and in- 
vestment decisions are being made. This informational advantage is a simple 
formalization of the notion that “banks are special,” an idea that is prominent 
in recent macroeconomic literature (Bernanke and Blinder 1988; Kashyap et 
al. 1993) and in earlier work in finance and development (Shaw 1973; McKin- 
non 1973). The other participants in this economy rely on the banking system 
to convey implicitly the relevant information about the magnitude of 6-the 
mean of the distribution-through  the credit conditions and real interest rates 
they choose to offer to the market. 
With a large number of atomistic firm-households and international invest- 
ors, no individual has an incentive to incur the costs of  assessing macroeco- 
nomic risks, since these costs would not be faced by competing firms. Compet- 
itors  would  gain  a  cost  advantage. Moreover,  the  variance of  market  or 
macroeconomic risk may be small compared to the variance of  firm-specific 
risk for any individual firm. Firm-households have a greater incentive to moni- 
tor idiosyncratic risk than do banks, which (given efficient portfolio manage- 
ment of their balance sheet) only face macroeconomic risk. The efficient solu- 
tion requires the competitive banking system to undertake the assessment of 
macroeconomic risks and each individual firm-household to concentrate on 
firm-specific or local risks, inferring the macroeconomic information for their 
investment and consumption decisions from the resulting market credit condi- 
tions and interest rates. 
The role of  the banking system is central to this discussion. However, if 
banks are “well behaved‘’-in  the sense that they act as efficient conduits of 
financial flows from savers to borrowers-the  solutions to our simple analyti- 
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DLE and ILE (at least ex ante) in figures 1.2 and  1.3, respectively, In each 
case, the outcome will be efficient given the information available at the begin- 
ning of the first period (including the private information of the banking sys- 
tem). Moreover, the ILE outcome Pareto dominates the DLE outcome-ex 
ante, it remains preferable to implement the structural reform program without 
controls on international capital  This is the sense in which  a well- 
behaved financial system simply operates as a veil behind which efficient real 
economic decisions are being made. 
Of course, ex post the outcome may not be efficient. Indeed, for some real- 
izations, it is possible that the DLE outcome may  Pareto dominate the ILE 
outcome. Domestic residents may have borrowed more than would have been 
desirable given the eventual realization of a. However, with the informational 
structure of the model as we have assumed, it is not possible to intervene to 
prevent these outcomes. The government would require better knowledge of 
the effects of the implementation of the structural reform program-and  our 
model does not have this form. As Conley and Maloney (1995) demonstrate, to 
provide a rationale for government intervention and the maintenance of capital 
controls, the authorities must have risk preferences different from those of the 
risk-neutral domestic residents. While there are plausible political economy 
justifications of  this structure, it does not sit easily with the assumption of 
identical firm-households (which permits use of representative agent analysis) 
and our implicit assumption that the government acts in the interests of  its 
constituents. To say simply that the government is “more risk averse” masks 
what the underlying problems might be. 
Accounting for downside risk that is intrinsic to the reform process offers a 
reasonable explanation of  countries’ reluctance to simultaneously and fully 
liberalize all markets including the capital account. However, for this rationale 
to be fully convincing, it is necessary to explain why the private sector is un- 
able to account for the riskiness of  the reform program itself. We  set about 
trying to explain why the private sector proves unable to solve this risk man- 
agement problem. Our explanation centers on market failure in the financial 
system. Market failure interacts with the special informational role  of  the 
banking system to generate an environment of  excessively optimistic private 
sector expectations. In contrast, the policy authorities make their economically 
important decisions before this environment is created and ought to be less 
susceptible to “bootstrap” effects that allow excessive optimism to feed on 
itself, leading to overborrowing. Unfortunately, short-term political considera- 
tions may foster triumphalist private sector expectations rather than restrain 
them. This offers a role for external monitors-international  organizations 
such as the IMF-in  pressuring governments to avoid excessive capital in- 
flows. 
3. A sufficient, but not necessary, condition for this result is our earlier assumption that all fim- 
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1.6  Deposit Insurance and Financial Market Failure 
We have shown that, even in the presence of  uncertainty, it is optimal to 
implement real structural reforms in the absence of administrative controls on 
the  cross-border  movement  of  international  capital, provided  the  domestic 
banks are well behaved. However, market failure and poor risk management in 
banking systems are common phenomena, especially when the banking system 
is exposed to novel forms and magnitudes of risk by the ongoing process of 
domestic economic liberalization  and financial  innovation. The nature and 
magnitude  of  the  capital  inflows  themselves  might  further  aggravate  the 
problem. 
To understand how capital inflows affect the solvency of banks, let us briefly 
describe how they change the risks faced by the banking sector. When large 
inflows of foreign financial capital enter the newly liberalized domestic bank- 
ing system, risk is likely to multiply rapidly. We can categorize the risks in the 
following manner: 
Credit risk-exposure  to the failure of a borrower to repay a loan-will 
increase as bank lending rises. A sudden increase in the availability of 
loanable funds through capital inflows may encourage greater invest- 
ment in risky prospects such as lending to real estate or securities mar- 
ket participants. 
Foreign exchange exposure is dramatically increased if the inflows are 
foreign currency denominated while the banks enjoy a comparative ad- 
vantage (informational or otherwise) in domestic lending in local cur- 
rency. Lack of experience and the absence of derivatives markets may 
make managing such risks more problematic in less-developed coun- 
tries (LDCs) than in developed nations. 
Real exchange rate risk rises because the profitability of traded goods 
industries is lowered as more capital flows in. 
Settlement risk rises if the payments system is incapable of dealing with 
the magnitude or direction of cross-border settlements. 
Liquidity risk will rise if the size of the capital inflows is large relative 
to that of domestic securities markets. If  banks attempt to invest the 
inflows in domestic markets (say real estate) they may simply bid up the 
price of housing, helping  to create bubbles  in real estate and equity 
prices and inducing destabilizing “herding” or “fad” behavior among 
market participants (Shiller 1991). 
Risks arise from the supervisory and regulatory framework: regulators 
face larger and different challenges in assessing the risks borne by the 
institutions they supervise when capital inflows are considerable and 
the risks described  above multiply. For example, regulations  may  be 
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lem assets, thus making it impossible to measure the quality of  their 
portfolios. 
All of the above effects can lead to greater systemic risk: the chances 
of  contagion between different banks will rise as credit, liquidity, and 
settlement risks rise. 
Here, we focus on the interaction between regulatory failure and the role of 
(possibly implicit) government-backed deposit insurance schemes. In order to 
preserve the integrity of  the payments system, the monetary authorities may 
feel compelled to offer a public guarantee of banks’ deposit liabilities. As has 
been well documented in the finance and development literature (reviewed in 
World Bank 1990), this is likely to introduce moral hazard into the banking 
system’s behavior. This  is but  one of  many  potential examples of  market 
failure. 
When the government insures deposits against adverse macroeconomic out- 
comes, it alters how the banking system views the risks associated with making 
loans. Therefore, the banks’ behavior changes as they exploit the authorities’ 
guarantee-this  is the essence of the moral hazard problem (McKinnon 1993, 
chap. 7). In our simple analytical framework, this process can be formalized 
as follows. The banks know the magnitude of 8 and thus the distribution from 
which the ultimate realization of a will be drawn. However, because of deposit 
insurance, the banks’ depositors are protected from outcomes in the lower tail 
of this distribution. Banks therefore base their lending and interest rate deci- 
sions on the value 6’, the mean of this truncated distribution, rather than 8, the 
mean of the true underlying distribution of a. 
Necessarily, 8’ is greater than 8. The banking system therefore behaves as if 
their private knowledge suggested better future economic performance follow- 
ing the liberalization process than is actually likely given the true realization 
of 6 (these ideas are formalized in appendix B). The consequences of this mar- 
ket failure depend on the capital account regime. 
In  the DLE, the effect is to raise the domestic interest rate (see fig. 1.4). 
Using the same approach as outlined above, a well-behaved financial system 
would set a market real interest rate rE, based on the expected productivity 
shock realization 8. Recall that real interest rates are entirely determined by 
technological factors in the DLE. If  the banking system suffers from moral 
hazard induced by deposit insurance, they will base their behavior on a produc- 
tivity shock 8‘ rather than 8. The implicit signal offered by  credit conditions 
will be that the likely outcome of the liberalization process is more favorable. 
Therefore, more of the firm-households will wish to adopt the modern technol- 
ogy, in the belief that it will be highly productive. However, this will induce 
excess demand for credit that can only be met by raising the real interest rate 
until it is once again tangent to both the traditional technology schedule and 
that associated with modern technology under the realization 6’-that  is, a 
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Fig. 1.4  Market failure in the DLE 
may be higher or lower than if the financial system were well behaved. There is 
no guarantee that overborrowing will occur. While first-period surplus output 
beyond internal investment for those firm-households that continue to employ 
the traditional (denoted T) production technique (x:”’,  where F denotes market 
failure in the financial system and D denotes the DLE) will  necessarily  be 
higher than would be the case with an efficient (denoted E) banking  system 
(x:”’),  first-period consumption (cf” and c$” in the market failure and efficient 
cases, respectively) and investment in the modem (denoted M) technology (de- 
termined  by xYDM  and xFDM  in the two cases) could be higher  or lower. The 
effect on the savings rate and aggregate borrowing  of  market failure in the 
DLE is therefore ambig~ous.~  Financial market failure is reflected  in higher 
financial yields; the effects on financial quantities-specifically  credit aggre- 
gates-are  uncertain. 
In the ILE, the interest rate r-*  is determined in the perfectly elastic interna- 
tional  capital  market. It cannot rise as in the DLE and therefore  cannot be 
indicative of market failure in the financial system. Instead, moral hazard in 
the banking system manifests itself through excessive capital inflows (see fig. 
1.5). The excessively optimistic reporting of prospective productivity gains by 
the banking system (i.e., the erroneous indication, implicitly signaled through 
credit conditions, that the expected productivity shock is 6’ rather than 6)  en- 
courages domestic residents to invest more heavily in the new technology than 
4. In fig.  1.4, we draw the knife-edge case where xYDM  xyDM  and cy1) = c:”:  consumplion and 
investment in the new technology are unchanged. Different assumptions about the relative magni- 
tude of  the offsetting income and substitution effects could result in higher or lower levels for 
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Fig. 1.5  Market failure in the ILE: the overborrowing syndrome 
is appropriate  for the actual expected productivity  realization  (at  QF1  rather 
than Q"', where I denotes the ILE). Moreover, domestic residents will overcon- 
sume in the first period (at cy instead of c:')  in anticipation of higher future 
incomes than are likely to emerge. Both overconsumption and overinvestment 
are financed in part by excessive borrowing from the rest of the world, beyond 
that which would maximize welfare ex ante in the absence of market failure. 
With  financial  failure,  aggregate  borrowing  by  the  liberalizing  economy 
N(c7' -  xp')  is unambiguously greater than the desired level of  aggregate bor- 
rowing when the financial system is well behaved, namely, N(cF;' -  xp). This 
is the essence of the overborrowing syndrome. 
1.7  Rational Beliefs and Rational Expectations 
Note that,  in the first period,  the behavior  of  the economy with  a well- 
functioning capital market (figs. 1.2 and 1.3)  is identical to that of  an economy 
with a poorly functioning financial system and a lower realization of a^  (known 
only to the banks) (figs. 1.4 and 1.5). Ex ante, for either the DLE or the ILE, 
these two situations are observationally equivalent. It is precisely this feature 
of the model that allows us to capture a phenomenon we believe is central to 
understanding overborrowing episodes. 
The "deep" productivity parameters in this model are not directly observable 
ex ante. Participants in the economy have to base their decisions on imperfect 
information inferred from the behavior of the economy as a whole and spe- 
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conduit for, information concerning macroeconomic risks-the  state of  do- 
mestic credit conditions. However, as mentioned above, there are two possible 
models of the economy that are consistent with the same values for all observ- 
ables in the first period. If participants wrongly attribute the initial boom to a 
favorable realization of B when in fact it is due to market failure in the financial 
system, overborrowing can arise. While such behavior turns out to have been 
inefficient ex post, there is nothing irrational about the private decisions being 
made ex ante. It is not irrational to be wrong if one could not detect one’s error 
on the basis of observable information. The most plausible explanation of how 
this could arise comes from uncertainty about the authorities’ information set. 
If  the authorities have the same information set as the banks, they ought to be 
able to supervise and regulate the financial system so as to prevent market 
failure. The nonbank domestic private sector, overseas investors, and even 
other policymakers may trust that regulation of the banking system is sufficient 
to ensure a well-behaved financial system. When policy credibility-including 
the credibility of bank regulation-is  high, overoptimism can emerge because 
nonbank private actors believe the financial system is well regulated and thus 
well behaved, when in practice it may not be (see the discussion of bank regula- 
tion in the next section). 
The rational expectations paradigm cannot deal with a multiplicity of poten- 
tial models that are indistinguishable ex ante. Central to the rational expecta- 
tions approach to economic theorizing is the existence of a common structural 
model of the economy that all participants share. This structure is believed to 
be correct in an objective sense. Our framework does not correspond to this 
view. We find it useful to draw on the concept of “rational beliefs,” introduced 
by  Kurz (1990). He proposed a wider notion that both encompasses and ex- 
tends that of rational expectations. The rational beliefs approach permits indi- 
viduals to hold different views about the structure of  the economy, provided 
the models implicit in these views are not refutable by observed or observable 
data. This structure allows the economy to deviate from “sustainable” paths in 
the short run-which  could last for an extended period-until  observed data 
demonstrate that the structural model implying this ex post unsustainable be- 
havior was incorrect. This approach has been applied to U.S. stock market data 
(Kurz 1993). We believe it is even more applicable in the current context. 
The rational beliefs structure closely resembles our view of how overbor- 
rowing emerges. Ex ante, domestic firm-households  believe the real economic 
reform program is credible and the financial system is well behaved; this is 
their Bayesian prior. Consequently, they will respond to the signals offered by 
the domestic financial system through real interest rates and credit conditions. 
Their confidence in the success of the reform program will be bolstered by the 
economic “boom” observed in the first period. Indeed, their prior beliefs are 
apparently confirmed by the performance of the economy (and the associated 
vast inflows of capital that occur in the ILE case). This is true whether or not 
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provement in economic performance that engenders the triumphalist assess- 
ment of the reform process that we identified in the introduction to this paper. 
Triumphalism itself breeds even greater confidence in the liberalization pro- 
gram-the  process creates a self-sustaining momentum of its own. 
Only when the true realization of the productivity shock is observed in the 
second period will the alternative models be distinguishable to the nonbank 
sectors. In some-unfortunately  rare-cases,  the triumphalist beliefs are are 
borne out.S  More frequently, they prove unfounded. It is financial market fail- 
ure that has been driving domestic credit expansion rather than genuine im- 
provements in structural economic performance. Ex post, domestic residents 
have overborrowed and participants in the international capital market have 
overlent. However, ex ante, there was nothing irrational about such decisions. 
They were justified on the basis of the model participants in the economy had 
in mind when the decisions were being made, a model that was consistent with 
and could not be falsified by observed data. 
Our previous work (Pill 1993) using macroeconomic modeling techniques 
similar to those proposed in the British context by  Muellbauer and Murphy 
(1990)-which  would be dismissed by  many as ad hoc theorizing devoid of 
microeconomic foundations-has  been criticized for failing to take into ac- 
count the sustainability conditions implied by forward-looking agents. Once 
we move to the rational beliefs approach outlined above, economic behavior is 
entirely consistent with sustainability and forward-looking  formation of expec- 
tations under the model of  the economy the market participants  themselves 
implicitly believe. This model turns out to be incorrect, but this was not appar- 
ent ex ante when investment and consumption decisions were made because 
the model held by participants and the “true” (bank market failure) model were 
observationally equivalent.6 
This framework therefore captures the intuition we discussed in the opening 
of this paper. Rather than being associated with lack of credibility of the reform 
program, overborrowing arises when domestic residents become excessively 
optimistic about the economy’s prospects following the implementation of re- 
form. These optimistic expectations are generated by market failure of  some 
form-in  our case, that induced in the banking system by deposit insurance- 
but the existence of such failures is obscured until it is too late for their effects 
to be accounted for. Consumption and investment decisions have already been 
made,  and overborrowing has occurred-this  is likely to ultimately prove 
highly costly to correct. 
5. This implicitly makes an assumption about the distribution HI(.),  namely, that it is symmetric 
and concentrated close to the mean. Of course, it is possible that ex ante excessive borrowing will 
turn out to be justified ex post by an unexpectedly favorable realization of the productivity shock. 
6. Even if foreign depositors realized the potential for financial market failure and the likelihood 
that banks will misrepresent 6, they still have little incentive to impose market discipline on the 
banks by removing their deposits while they believe the deposit insurance scheme will bail them 
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Our earlier macroeconomic models (e.g., Pill 1993) ignore the long-run sus- 
tainability issues raised by intertemporal choices. This has been criticized as 
ad hoc. Once we move to a rational beliefs framework, such criticism rings 
hollow. The behavior described by our macroeconomic models need not ignore 
the transversality conditions imposed by intertemporal optimization problems. 
It is simply that the agents are using what ultimately turns out to be the wrong 
economic model. Their behavioral decisions may be consistent with long-run 
sustainability constraints in the context of the implicit economic model they 
believe. Unfortunately, this model proves to be a poor description of the true 
underlying economic structure because it does not encompass market failures 
in the banking system. Clearly, further work is required to marry the macroeco- 
nomic modeling more closely to the microfoundations offered by the rational 
beliefs framework. 
1.8  Policy Responses to Overborrowing 
What are the appropriate policy responses to overborrowing of  this form? 
Before returning to the simple structural model outlined above, it is illuminat- 
ing to draw some parallels with Keynes’s policy prescriptions for the Depres- 
sion. Central to Keynes’s explanation of the Depression  (Keynes 1936) was 
the self-sustaining nature of low private sector economic confidence and real 
activity. If the private sector’s “animal spirits” were negative, economic activity 
was discouraged. But the lack of economic activity merely reinforced the nega- 
tive sentiment. Keynes argued that a government-led economic stimulus could 
break the self-sustaining vicious circle of low confidence and low activity. 
The overborrowing syndrome has similar features. The triumphalist animal 
spirits associated with the initiation of  economic reform stimulate economic 
activity that,  in turn, reinforces optimism about the liberalization  program, 
which seems to be generating immediate tangible rewards. Rather than to stim- 
ulate real activity as in the Keynesian case, government intervention may be 
required to restrain positive animal spirits and the self-sustaining excesses of 
the initial boom phase of the reform program. 
In describing the appropriate policy response to potential  overborrowing, 
one should respect the informational constraints on the authorities imposed by 
the information structure of the model. Specifically, the government is unaware 
of the realization of 6, the privileged information obtained by the banking sys- 
tem. Uncertainty about whether the authorities know this privileged informa- 
tion is a cause of the potential for observationally equivalent equilibria de- 
scribed above. 
The most  straightforward policy  response-and  the first-best solution- 
would be to eliminate the market failure in the banking system altogether. As 
we saw above, the nonbank sectors could then rely on the financial system to 
offer correct signals about real macroeconomic shocks and an ex ante efficient 
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posits, there would be no moral hazard for the banks to exploit. In principle, the 
banking system would then behave efficiently and give the correct information 
signals to the market as a whole. Unfortunately, the effects of such a policy are 
unlikely to be so positive. The authorities face a time consistency problem. Ex 
ante, it is clearly in their interest to disavow any responsibility for bank depos- 
its in the hope of imposing the correct market discipline on the banking system. 
However, ex post-in  the event of financial crisis-the  government and central 
bank will be compelled to bail out at least the core of the financial system in 
order to protect the integrity of the payments and settlement system and main- 
tain at least the semblance of international confidence. Banks are special, not 
because they are financial intermediaries, but because they are custodians of 
the monetary system. The banks will realize this at the outset and thus behave 
as if there is deposit insurance because of the authorities de facto or implicit 
deposit insurance scheme. The government’s rejection of deposit insurance is 
unlikely to be credible.’ 
If  deposit insurance (whether explicit or implicit) is de facto almost inevita- 
ble, one could attempt to limit its effects by  creating of  a small number of 
“narrow banks” to form the core of the payments system. These would be more 
heavily regulated and restricted than the generality of peripheral banks that, in 
principle, would be allowed to fail in the event of  financial crisis since their 
collapse would not threaten the integrity of the settlement system.8  However, it 
is probably more difficult to “ring fence” the payments system than this simple 
outline describes. Contagion and systemic risk are likely to breach the rather 
artificial distinction between core “narrow” banks and peripheral banks. It is 
likely the government would be faced with the same time consistency issue as 
described above. 
One solution to the moral hazard problem would be to regulate the banks 
sufficiently closely that they could not exploit the consequent creation of moral 
hazard. In our framework, if  the authorities have the necessary information, 
regulation will be perfect and overborrowing cannot arise. If  the authorities 
lack the privileged information, their attempts at regulation may be misguided. 
It is precisely the confidence of the nonbank private sector in the efficiency of 
banking supervision and regulation that  leads domestic firm-households to 
hold Bayesian priors that the financial system is well behaved. Of course, even 
when  the authorities have imperfect knowledge of  macroeconomic shocks, 
there is considerable scope for improvement in bank regulation, especially in 
7. This phenomenon was demonstrated in the seminal Chilean example. Initially the authorities 
pursued a “free banking” policy, with no intervention in the financial or banking system and no 
explicit deposit insurance scheme. However, it is apparent that market failure in the banking sector 
was endemic by  1982 as banks exploited the moral hazard generated by  the inevitable implicit 
deposit insurance. 
8. This is a possible characterization of the U.K. system in which the “Big Four” retail, clearing 
banks (plus the main Scottish banks and possibly a couple of others) are simply “too big to fail.” 
Although their designation as “narrow banks” is unofficial, they act in concert with the Bank of 
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LDCs, where existing systems are generally primitive. However, as suggested 
above, the very fact of  large capital inflows is itself likely to undermine the 
regulatory system since it will increase the magnitude of intermediation to be 
assessed and introduce new forms of risk (such as exchange risk, risks arising 
from cross-national differences in legal systems, or cross-border settlement 
risk). Improvements in bank regulation are desirable but are unlikely to be a 
completely effective policy response to potential overborrowing. 
Conley and Maloney (1995) have investigated whether the optimal policy 
response to potential overborrowing is to open the capital account of the bal- 
ance of payments and allow international financial capital unfettered access to 
domestic financial  institutions or  to  keep  the  capital  account  completely 
closed. This prejudges the issue of whether it is appropriate to consider only 
polar extremes-perfect  capital mobility (the pure ILE) and complete absence 
of cross-border capital flows (the pure DLE). Where trade-offs exist, econom- 
ics generally suggests interior solutions are optimal. 
We  have already shown that, should the banking system be well behaved, 
the market solution is efficient and there is no scope for policy intervention. 
The optimal policy is to allow unrestricted cross-border movement of capital; 
a polar solution is first-best. However, the authorities do not know ex ante 
whether the banking system is well behaved or suffers from market failure. 
Nevertheless, if they did, simply communicating the information to the private 
sector (both domestic residents and potential foreign investors) would solve 
the problem of itself. It is central to our rational beliefs framework that the two 
situations are indistinguishable ex ante both to the nonbank private sector and 
to the policy authorities. 
This is a strict interpretation of  the rational beliefs equilibrium. Using a 
weaker solution concept-which  might be called a “pseudorational beliefs” 
equilibrium-one  could envisage such an announcement being insufficient to 
correct the problem. Depositors, both domestic and foreign, would be pro- 
tected by deposit insurance and would have no incentive to withdraw their sav- 
ings from the banking system. Similarly, on the asset side of the banks’ balance 
sheet, adverse selection from the macroeconomic risk could imply continued 
excessive borrowing for high-risk projects (McKinnon 1993, chap. 7). How- 
ever, the problem of adverse selection is beyond the scope of the simple model 
presented in this paper. 
Remember that the authorities are forced to choose a capital account regime 
before any of the uncertainty in our model is resolved. That is, they cannot 
infer from the banks’ lending and interest rate decisions whether (given the 
government’s knowledge of If,(;)) it is more likely that there is market failure 
in the banking system or that there will be a good outcome for the probability 
shock. The banks’ choice of credit supply will depend on the choice of capital 
regime; one has already been chosen before any information can be inferred. 
Although the information available to the nonbank private sector and the policy 
authorities is identical at any point in time, the two groups make their economi- 31  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
cally important decisions in different information environments. The nonbank 
private sector makes its consumption and investment decisions taking the mac- 
roeconomic environment-most  importantly, credit conditions-as  given. It 
is precisely this timing that allows triumphalist sentiment about the reform 
program to be generated and the problems of overborrowing to emerge. There 
are spillovers or externalities between private sector agents-the  optimism of 
one firm-household helps to generate macroeconomic conditions which foster 
optimism among others-that  are mutually reinforcing. 
In contrast, the government’s decision about policy regime is taken before 
macroeconomic conditions are observed; indeed, determination of the latter 
depends vitally on the former. Rather than taking macroeconomic conditions 
as given, the authorities ought to be aware of their ability to affect them. More- 
over, the authorities should not prove susceptible to the spillover effects gener- 
ated through optimistic expectations. As already noted, to the extent that they 
are absorbed in triumphalist euphoria, external monitors  such as the IMF 
should step in to calm the excessive optimism and maintain macroeconomic 
stability. 
The government’s choice of welfare-maximizing capital account regime is 
therefore based on a productivity shock given by  the expected value of  6, 
which we denote a. Moreover, the authorities should entertain the possibility 
that market failure may occur in the financial system. Those countries that have 
suffered most extensively from overborrowing problems have either assumed 
away  such problems (as in the Chilean “free banking” experiment during 
1978-82)  or have been complacent about the omniscience or ability of their 
bank regulators (as in the United Kingdom in the late 1980s). 
McKinnon (1973, 1993) has argued that deposits held by foreign residents 
at domestic banks should be subject to the same level of  reserve requirements 
as domestic deposits. Note that non-interest-bearing  reserve requirements are 
an implicit tax  on financial intermediation. In the absence of  such require- 
ments, there is a bias toward capital inflows that, as we have seen, can prove de- 
stabilizing. 
In our framework, the international capital market is perfectly elastic. The 
public finance literature suggests that the burden of the tax-although  nomi- 
nally a reserve requirement on deposits-will  fall entirely on borrowers, who 
are all domestic residents. Foreign depositors require a market rate of return, 
and therefore the reserve requirement tax on them must be zero. Moreover, a 
natural extension of  Pigovian taxation theory would suggest that the implicit 
reserve requirement tax could be larger than that applied to domestic deposits 
to account for the macroeconomic externalities introduced by  the instability 
caused by overborrowing. 
Our model supports these conclusions. It may well be preferable to have no 
capital controls rather than to have  completely exclusionary capital controls 
because, ex ante, the ILE solution is likely to Pareto dominate the DLE solu- 
tion whether the financial system is well behaved or not (see figs. 1.6A and c2  A 
P 





comparison with market failure 
(A) Welfare comparison in absence of market failure; (B)  Welfare 33  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
1.6B).  The former is straightforward  to interpret; the latter requires more expla- 
nation (see appendix C).  Problems arise because those firm-households that 
continue to use the traditional technology in the market failure DLE will attain 
a different welfare level from those that adopt the modem technology. This 
may prevent Pareto comparisons with the ILE when there is financial market 
failure. As figure 1.6B is drawn here, the expected utility of firm-households 
in the ILE exceeds the maximum attainable utility of any firm-household in 
the DLE. Therefore, ex ante, the ILE Pareto dominates the DLE. The potential 
for overborrowing to occur does not justify the imposition of  controls com- 
pletely excluding the inflow of foreign capital. 
Nevertheless, ex ante, an interior solution with limited capital controls will 
Pareto dominate both polar outcomes. If  one could impose different require- 
ments on borrowing intended for investment purposes and on borrowing for 
consumption purposes, then the Pigovian tax reserve requirements could repli- 
cate the first-best outcome achieved in the absence of market failure (provided 
the  tax  revenue  could  be  costlessly  redistributed  to  all  domestic  firm- 
households in a nondistortionary way; i.e., lump-sum transfers are possible) 
(see fig.  1.7). As figure  1.7 is drawn here, a higher reserve requirement is 
needed on borrowing for consumption. This arises from the implicit assump- 
tions about the nature of technology and preferences embodied in the way we 
have drawn the production function and indifference curves. The representa- 
tion used here corresponds to our earlier discussion of  the stylized facts of 
overborrowing episodes. These facts suggested that the problem manifests it- 
self largely through excessive consumption rather than excessive investment. 
While this does not necessarily imply a higher reserve requirement on con- 
sumer borrowing:  intuition would suggest such an outcome is likely. 
By imposing an implicit tax on foreign deposits, in the form of a reserve 
requirement, the effective real interest rate for domestic borrowers is raised; 
the budget  constraints have  slope tt  for investment and  t’t’ for consump- 
tion. In the market failure model, this will reduce both first-period invest- 
ment  and  first-period  consumption  toward  their  optimal  levels  (from 
xy toward x?  and from cy toward cf‘, respectively). Such a policy will reduce 
the  extent  of  overborrowing  and  improve  ex  ante  welfare  for  all  firm- 
households. As noted above, with differential reserve requirements for invest- 
ment and consumption borrowing and lump-sum transfers, an ex  ante first- 
best solution can be obtained, even in the presence of financial market failure. 
Unfortunately, achieving this result imposes very strong information require- 
ments on the government that are difficult to attain. 
Obviously, in the well-behaved banking sector model, such reserve require- 
9. Since the world real interest rate is exogenous in our model, it is income, rather than substitu- 
tion, effects that  will determine the relative magnitude of overborrowing for consumption and 
investment purposes. In contrast, the magnitude of the optimal reserve requirement will be deter- 
mined solely by substitution effects because, with lump-sum transfers, expected real income is un- 
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Fig. 1.7  Policy responses to overborrowing 
ments introduce an inefficient distortion. However, since the government inter- 
nalizes the potentially large macroeconomic costs of overborrowing and subse- 
quent financial crisis in a way that private individual firm-households do not, 
the policy authorities may view the imposition of such controls as welfare im- 
proving ex ante. Even for relatively small probabilities that the financial market 
failure model is objectively true, the potential costs of financial crisis following 
an overborrowing episode are large enough to justify a small efficiency loss 
should the financial system turn out to be well behaved. 
The public  finance  literature  generally  assumes  a  second-best  world,  in 
which lump-sum transfers cannot be made and the redistribution of tax revenue 
is costly in terms of efficiency. Moreover, it would be difficult to enforce differ- 
ential reserve requirements  for consumption  and  investment  lending. There 
would be incentives for the private sector to organize between the two markets 
for borrowing and to extract supernormal rents. In a plausible, practical setting, 
only much blunter policy tools are available. A single reserve requirement (ex- 
cept in pathological cases) will not be able to precisely replicate the first-best 
solution, although the outcome will still Pareto dominate the polar extremes."' 
If  the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution is greater than the marginal 
rate of intertemporal transformation over the relevant ranges, then additional 
controls on consumption  borrowing, beyond  the  reserve requirement  tax  on 
investment borrowing, may be justified. 
10. Strictly, it will always dominate the perfect capital mobility pole that. in turn, almost always 
dominates the zero capital mobility pole. 35  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
1.9  Conclusions: Policy Implications 
How should policymakers respond to the possibility of overborrowing in the 
course of an otherwise successful liberalization program? Improved banking 
regulation with higher capital and reserve requirements could help. However, 
such measures are unlikely to prove fully effective, given the banking indus- 
try’s inherently asymmetric information structure. The authorities may wish to 
impose other financial controls to limit the potential for damage should over- 
borrowing arise. Controls on cross-border movements of financial capital are 
one appropriate tool. This summary of policy options draws on the experience 
of East Asian countries that have successfully liberalized. 
Restrain  short-term  capital  Jows,  particularly  those  intermediated 
through the domestic banking system (as in Japan in the  1950s and 
1960s). The preferred policy instrument is probably reserve require- 
ments rather than direct administrative  controls. These level the playing 
field between domestic and foreign sources of funds and are harder to 
evade. Marginal reserve requirements could be increased if capital con- 
trols become unduly large. 
Be more liberal with  “direct” investment, perhaps in the form of joint 
ventures with domestic partners. Direct investment brings new technol- 
ogy into the economy and by-passes the banking system-thus  avoiding 
the market failure problems discussed above. 
Limit organized consumer borrowing-say  on bank credit cards-and 
restrict access to mortgage finance (as in Japan and Taiwan through the 
1970s). Such measures should help to prevent the runaway excess de- 
mand for consumer durables and nontraded services that may reignite 
domestic price inflation. 
Consolidate compulsory social security contributions into a Singapore- 
style provident fund. A fully funded compulsory saving program- 
geared to preventing the dramatic falls in private saving seen during 
overborrowing episodes-should  be considered earlier rather than later 
in the liberalization process. 
After its overborrowing debacle in the late 1970s through 1981, all of these 
measures were subsequently introduced into Chile during the 1980s. During 
Chile’s successful recovery in the 1990s, these measures have helped to sustain 
domestic saving and prevent exchange rate overvaluation when pressure from 
capital inflows-now  largely incipient-again  become very great. 
The example of  several successful East Asian economies in avoiding the 
overborrowing problem during their liberalization programs in the 1960s and 
1970s suggests the policy conclusions of our analysis are appropriate in the 
context of stabilization and liberalization policies currently being introduced 
in Latin America, India, Egypt, and elsewhere. 36  Ronald I. McKinnon and Huw Pill 
Appendix A 
To algebraically solve for the DLE outcomes, we can exploit two of the main 
advantages of the Fisherian two-period framework, namely, that the real inter- 
est rate is purely technologically determined and that investment and consump- 
tion decisions are separable. In order to find the equilibrium real interest rate, 
we solve for firm investment decisions as a function of the interest rate. 
Firms maximize the present value of their net worth (a measure of firm value 
or wealth) taking the real interest rate as given. For those firms adopting the 
modern technology, 
max W = [$J  -  (i -  m), 
where W is wealth, i is investment inclusive of fixed costs, and m is the initial 
endowment. The resulting first-order condition, where i,  is optimal investment 
in the modern technique, is 
(fa 
Equating the marginal rate of transformation to the gross real interest rate, 
we can solve this implicit function for investment as a function of the interest 
rate, substitute it back into the production function for modern technology, and 
differentiate to find the marginal rate of  transformation as a function of the 
interest rate: 
(A3)  MRT,(r)  = g’(i,(r)). 
g(i,)  = 1 + Y. 
Repeating this analysis for the traditional technology results in an expres- 
sion for the marginal rate of transformation in the original production process. 
The equilibrium condition requires the marginal rate of transformation to be 
equated across production techniques. We therefore have an equation that can 
be solved for the equilibrium DLE real interest rate: 
(A41  MRT,(r)  = MRT,(r)  3  r,,,. 
Substituting the equilibrium real interest rate and the implied level of invest- 
ment in the original maximized expression, we find wealth. Consumption deci- 
sions are now made, maximizing utility for given wealth and real interest rate. 
The problem gives the equilibrium levels of consumption,  c, and c,  (which 
are common  to all  households  regardless  of  which  production  techniques 
they use): 
(‘45) 
These consumption and investment levels define the equilibrium level of 
borrowing (by the firms that adopt modem technology) and financial saving 37  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
(by those which retain the original production technique). Market clearing in 
the credit market is described by  the following expression, which also pins 
down the proportion of firm-households  that choose either the traditional tech- 
nique (T) or the modern technique (M): 
In the ILE, the real interest rate is determined by the perfectly elastic inter- 
national capital market. As we have seen, with the world real rate lower than 
the DLE equilibrium rate, all domestic residents adopt the modern technology. 
The solution procedure is then straightforward: simply substitute the world 
rate, r*, into the expressions for investment (A3), wealth (Al), and consump- 
tion (A5) for the modem production technique firms derived above. 
Appendix B 
In  this  appendix,  we  present  a  simple  formal  model  of  deposit- 
insurance-induced  market failure in the banking system. For the purposes of 
the exposition in the main text, all we require is that banks discount outcomes 
in the lower tail of  the probability distribution. This would appear to be an 
implication of any plausible formalization of moral hazard caused by govem- 
ment guarantees of  the banks’ deposit liabilities. 
However, to pursue a more formal analysis, we aim to endogenize  the results 
of the market failure. Specifically, we attempt to encompass how changes in- 
duced in bank behavior by the existence of  deposit insurance alter the choices 
made by  the nonbank private sector. In principle, this can affect the welfare 
ranking of potential capital account regimes. 
The point is essentially as follows. Deposit insurance encourages banks to 
ease credit conditions. The domestic nonbank private sector reacts to such eas- 
ing by increasing the amount it borrows to invest and consume. The higher 
gearing this implies makes bankruptcy more likely, and thus increases the po- 
tential worth of the deposit insurance scheme to the banking system. 
As this discussion suggests, we have a simultaneous system that has to be 
solved to find the relevant market failure distortion. In the main text, we as- 
sumed that the market failure results in banks’ using a realization of the distri- 
bution for the probability shock 2,  when the true realization is 8. These two 
are related as follows: 8’ is the expected value of a’, where a’  is defined as: 
(B 1)  a’  =a  if  a E (a, -) 
a’  =d  if  a E (--,a), 38  Ronald I. McKinnon and Huw Pill 
and d is the true realization of a at which the average private sector firm (i.e., 
the firm with idiosyncratic shock E = 0) will go bankrupt. 
Whether a firm-household goes bankrupt depends on the amount of  bor- 
rowing it does in the first period. This, in turn, is related to the signals offered 
by  the banking system about the success of  the reform program through the 
market credit conditions. The private sector-if  it believes the banking system 
is well behaved-will  choose to invest according to the schedules derived in 
appendix A. The argument presented here applies only to the ILE; this is the 
simpler case, because real interest rates are exogenously determined. Similar 
intuition applies to the DLE, but the derivation is harder because one has to 
account for the effect of market failure on the equilibrium interest rate, which 
also affects consumption, investment, and borrowing decisions. 
We  showed in appendix A that in the ILE, investment will be determined by 
equating the marginal rate of transformation to the real interest rate. We  now 
augment this expression to include the expected value of the stochastic produc- 
tivity shock, where this expectation is flawed because of  the market failure 
(denoted by F) in the banking system. 
(B2)  2’ g’ (i) = 1 + r*  a i,,  = iMF(ii’). 
This investment decision will imply an expected level of wealth, which itself 
is an argument of the consumption function derived from utility maximization. 
This implies that borrowing, b, is a function of  2‘ for two reasons: first, it 
increases the borrowing undertaken for investment since the returns available 
seem greater, and second, it raises consumption borrowing since higher returns 
imply higher wealth: 
033)  b(8’) = m -  [i(S’)  + c,(8’)]. 
The firm household will go bankrupt if, after paying off its creditors out of 
its period-two output, there is no residual for consumption. Therefore, d  is 
defined as follows: 
034)  dg(i(8’)) -  (1 + r*)  b(8’)  = 0. 
This gives d as a function of 8‘  and therefore allows us to find the simultaneous 
solution of equations (B4) and (B2). 
Appendix C 
This appendix briefly describes how to interpret figure 1.6B, which offers an 
ex ante welfare comparison of the DLE and ILE when there is market failure 
in the financial system. Figure 1.6A has already clearly demonstrated that, in 
the absence of  such market failure, the ILE is Pareto superior to the DLE. 39  The Overborrowing Syndrome 
Therefore,  if  the ILE  also welfare  dominates the  DLE when  market  fail- 
ure exists, then policymakers  should undertake their liberalization  and real 
reform programs  even if  appropriate controls on capital inflows cannot be 
secured. 
As discussed in the main text, if banks are subject to market failure they will 
set credit conditions such that the nonbank private sector assumes the expected 
productivity shock will be A’,  rather than its true magnitude A.  As shown in 
figure 1.4, in the DLE this implies consumption at CFD and production either 
at QFDT  (for the firm-households continuing to use the traditional technology) 
or at QmM (for those adopting the modern technology). Similarly, figure 1.5 
shows consumption at CF’  and production at Q“  (for all firm-households) in 
the ILE. 
What implications does this have for welfare analysis? As external observ- 
ers, we know that the true magnitude of the expected productivity shock is A; 
therefore, we should base our ex ante analysis on this productivity level. 
Consider first the DLE. A complication arises here because there are two 
groups of  firm-households (one continuing to use the traditional technology, 
the other exploiting the postreform production process) that achieve different 
levels of utility. Although (as we showed in the main text) there is no presump- 
tion that consumption or investment in the modern technology will be too high 
or too low with financial market failure in the DLE, because the equilibrium 
real interest rate is higher than would be the case if the banking system were 
efficient, borrowers will have to pay more interest and are thus worse off. In 
contrast, depositors with the banking system-that  is, those firm-households 
continuing to employ the traditional technology-enjoy  higher interest pay- 
ments, guaranteed by the deposit insurance scheme. They will actually be bet- 
ter off than if there were no market failure. In figure 1.68, we simply draw the 
utility level achieved by the depositors; this is the maximum utility attainable 
by a firm-household in the DLE market failure equilibrium (max u”,,). 
Now consider the ILE. First-period consumption and investment decisions 
by the nonbank private sector are based on the expected productivity shock 8’. 
These are irreversible when the realization of the true value of a is apparent. 
For the actual magnitude of the expected productivity shock A,  the intertempo- 
ral budget constraint  will be represented  by  the lower line. This has  slope 
-(1  + r*) and goes through the “true” expected production function at xy 
(note that this is not a point of tangency since firms are maximizing with re- 
spect to the anticipated productivity shock 2’ rather than the “true” expected 
productivity shock 2). With consumption in the first period already determined 
at cy,  this implies an expected welfare level qLE  (again, the indifference curve 
is not tangent to the budget constraint because consumption decisions are be- 
ing made in anticipation of the better productivity shock rather than the true 
expected productivity shock). 
Figure 1.6B has uELE > max (IELE.  The expected utility in the market failure 
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With our simplifying assumption of risk neutrality, this is sufficient to establish 
that the ILE Pareto dominates the DLE in the presence of  financial market 
failure as well as when the banking system is efficient. (Obviously, such an 
assumption is not necessary. Modest levels of risk aversion would not materi- 
ally affect the result.) In this case, the ILE welfare dominates the DLE unam- 
biguously. If the authorities are forced to adopt a polar capital account regime, 
one with no impediments to the cross-border movement of international capital 
is preferable. 
This result depends on how the diagram is drawn; one could envisage cases 
(with different preferences, technologies, or world real interest rates) in which 
qLE  < max  IJEDLE.  Clearly, this is insufficient to reverse the policy implication. 
Even if the depositors in the DLE (those firm-households  continuing to employ 
the traditional technology) are better off than would be the case in the ILE, 
there remain those firm-households that have adopted the modern, postreform 
production process. The latter group are necessarily worse off in the market 
failure DLE than they would be in the market failure ILE. In such a case, the 
two capital account regimes are simply not Pareto rankable. 
Simply because there is potential market failure in the financial system, one 
cannot conclude that it is preferable to implement the liberalization and reform 
program while excluding foreign capital. The benefits arising from consump- 
tion smoothing may dominate the costs of overborrowing. However, as shown 
in the main text, partial capital controls can help mitigate the latter problem 
while not ruling out exploitation of the benefits of the former. 
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Comment  Francisco de Asis Nadal De Simone 
McKinnon and Pill’s paper presents a model that tries to capture what is re- 
ferred to as the “overborrowing” syndrome that follows macroeconomic stabi- 
lization and real-side reform. This syndrome comprises an inflow of “exces- 
sive” foreign capital that produces an excess of domestic demand, inflation in 
nontradables, loss of monetary control, and, finally, the likely reversal of the 
reform process. 
If reforms are credible, if there is certainty and perfect information, and if 
contracts can be enforced easily, the structure of the financial system is neutral 
even  without  capital  account restrictions.  Overborrowing  does not  arise. If 
those assumptions do  not hold, however, the overborrowing syndrome appears 
because the financial system is no longer neutral: banks are “special.” Banks 
are unique because of institutional features, such as deposit insurance schemes, 
that induce market participants to take relatively higher risks. This fact together 
with the credit rationing that results from less than perfect information are the 
sources of excessive capital inflows. As those capital inflows endanger the re- 
form process, some restrictions on credit expansion must be put in place and 
some capital controls must remain. 
The paper, therefore,  produces  a conceptual  framework for analyzing  the 
overborrowing syndrome in the context of a small open economy that has un- 
dertaken a disinflation program using the exchange rate as nominal anchor, 
together with a successful liberalization of current account transactions. Cases 
both without and with free capital mobility are considered. However, it is the 
combination  of disinflation with free capital flows that most interests us be- 
cause this is the policy mix that leads to overborrowing. 
The paper focuses on credible reform  and stabilization programs.  I  shall 
deal with four issues: (1) empirical regularities observed in disinflation pro- 
grams, (2)  reasons why the explanation of the capital inflows cannot be dissoci- 
ated from the credibility issue, (3) reasons why banks, if truly “special,” de- 
serve a more explicit modeling than undertaken in the paper, and (4) features 
that a model trying to explain the boom-bust or the bust-boom  cycle should 
have. 
Empirical Regularities 
Countries using either exchange-rate-based  (EB) anchors or money-based 
(MB) anchors have experienced a slow convergence of the inflation rate to the 
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devaluation rate, or to the rate of growth of the relevant money aggregate. As 
a result, they have experienced an appreciation of the real exchange rate-in 
many cases, quite substantial. 
However, the choice of the nominal anchor seems to matter for the path of 
economic activity. EB programs have been observed to produce an initial rise 
in consumption and in real activity followed by  a contraction; the reverse is 
true of  MB programs. Most important for our concern here, however, is the 
behavior of the external accounts and the real interest rate. 
Under EB  programs, the current account has always deteriorated as sug- 
gested in the paper. The real interest rate fell in the “tablita” program of the 
late 1970s in Argentina, in the Austral plan in Argentina (1983, in the Cruzado 
plan in Brazil (1986), and in the Israeli plan (1983, all programs based on an 
exchange rate anchor. The interest rate has risen, however, in the heterodox 
programs of the mid-1980s. 
In MB programs, the current account has not shown a clear pattern and, if 
anything, has seemed to show some short-run improvement. The interest rate 
has tended to rise sharply. This was the case in Chile in 1975 and in Argentina 
and Brazil in 1990, for example. 
Credibility of the Reform and Stabilization Programs 
The paper discards too quickly, I believe, the role of credibility. I was sur- 
prised to see that Reinhart and Vkgh’s  quantitative analysis is mentioned to 
support the view that credibility is not enough to explain the facts mentioned 
above. In that paper, however, less than full credibility is assumed. The same 
assumption is made in a more recent paper by Calvo and Vkgh (1992), where 
the IMF study is also quoted in support of the view that in the cases mentioned 
we are dealing with less than fully credible reforms. I think that McKinnon 
and Pill’s paper belongs more to that framework than the authors admit. This 
results in tension between the text, the model, and the empirical regularities. 
1. The disinflation and reform programs mentioned in the paper are less than 
fully credible as the persistence of inflation shows. This has been attributed in 
the literature to backward indexation or to nonsynchronized price setting. At a 
policy level, it has motivated the use of some heterodox policies such as price 
and wage controls. Interestingly enough, the result has been that heterodox and 
orthodox programs have  shared similar characteristics, suggesting that these 
measures cannot solve the fundamental problem of lack of credibility. 
If  the foreign inflation rate is zero as assumed in the model, the domestic 
rate of inflation must converge to zero as well. The fact that it does not is more 
consistent with a less than fully credible reform and stabilization program. 
Note that the success of  the fiscal reform seems to be unrelated to the dy- 
namics  discussed. Thus,  a  successful fiscal reform, although necessary, is 
clearly not sufficient. What is necessary is to convince market participants that 
the overall program is both economically and politically sustainable. 
2. Another factor that makes me think that it would be better to view the EB 
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program were fully credible, we should instead expect inflation to fall immedi- 
ately to its new equilibrium, consistent with the new steady state, given by the 
lower rate of devaluation. The real exchange rate would not change or would 
rise. 
In a truly dynamic model where the equilibrium real exchange rate is mod- 
eled explicitly and agents have rational expectations, it could be shown that 
credible liberalization will lead economic agents to expect a higher equilib- 
rium real exchange rate. Thus, the expected rate of  return  on foreign  asset 
holdings will also be higher tomorrow, and agents will spend less today. This 
will produce an excess supply of nontraded goods that will be removed via a 
reduction of  their price, a depreciation  of  the real exchange rate. This will 
depend on the share of nontraded goods in domestic expenditure, the relative 
price elasticity of  the excess demand for traded goods, the influence of  the 
difference between the rate of time preference and the real interest rate on the 
desired excess of domestic spending over domestic income. If the liberalization 
is not credible, domestic spending will increase today in anticipation of  the 
reversal of the liberalization measures, a fact consistent with most Latin Amer- 
ican countries experience with trade liberalization. The real exchange rate will 
appreciate making further adjustment more difficult. 
3. I think that the fact that a large proportion of capital inflows is in the form 
of  overseas deposits placed with the domestic banking  sector is not related 
solely to implicit deposit insurance. It is instead most likely another aspect of 
the  short-term  view  adopted  by  foreign capital  and therefore an argument 
in favor of  thinking  that the market  does not  view reforms  as sustainable. 
The purpose of the capital inflow is to profit from the expected real exchange 
rate appreciation. This is another consequence of the noncredibility of the pro- 
gram. 
4.  Moreover, it is argued in the paper that the market perceives the increase 
in income following the successful real-side reform as permanent. In a truly 
intertemporal framework-using  some version of the permanent-income hy- 
pothesis of consumption, for example-permanent  increases in income are not 
likely to affect the current account. This is not what the stylized facts show. 
Temporary changes in income or anticipated future changes in permanent in- 
come can be associated with changes in savings and in the current account. 
A related matter is that overborrowing is the result of domestic financial 
market inefficiencies. This sort of Ponzi scheme is most likely to be associated 
with transient changes in economic policy. 
5. In the model, once excess demand is generated via the inflow of foreign 
capital, it should be followed by inflation in the nontradable sector together 
with a current account deficit. This is consistent with a less than fully credible 
EB program. If  the public expects a higher rate of devaluation to be resumed 
in the future (it is now zero), the fall in the nominal lending interest rate is 
perceived as temporary. As this reduces the cost of present consumption with 
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there is a current account deficit. The overheated economy keeps the rate of 
inflation above that of devaluation, and the real exchange rate appreciates. Over 
time, the real exchange rate appreciation reduces excess aggregate demand for 
home goods, and output declines. 
Policymakers have noticed that the increase in liquidity is dangerous. For 
this reason, some programs have also implemented higher reserve require- 
ments, a higher discount rate, or tightened controls on short-term capital flows. 
These measures largely explain the sharp increase in real interest rates, as in 
Israel in 1985. 
Financial Market Imperfections and “Special” Banks 
First a naive comment: in most countries of the world some form of deposit 
insurance exists, and it is difficult to see why it should play such a crucial role 
when a stabilization program is undertaken, or, in other words, why it should 
not play a more pervasive role in international capital markets. Now let me 
comment on the imperfections suggested in the text of the paper but not fully 
incorporated in the model. 
As hinted already, the belief that deposit insurance may actually be responsi- 
ble for the kind of boom-bust or bust-boom cycle studied here seems some- 
what exaggerated. Many industrialized nations provide some form of deposit 
insurance, with some exceptions. The Australian central bank has the authority 
to take over a troubled institution, although there is no formal deposit scheme. 
In Luxembourg, small-depositor insurance does not appear to be guaranteed. 
In New  Zealand, it is expressly prohibited. In  Canada, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom, insurance is provided by  the banking authorities. In Japan 
and Belgium, banks and the authorities operate insurance facilities jointly. In 
France, Italy, Germany, and Sweden, it is the banking industry that administers 
deposit insurance. Within the European Union, the 1986 Banking Directive 
recommended that deposit insurance schemes cover all credit institutions. 
Given the extent of deposit insurance, namely in countries over all the spec- 
trum of capital mobility, it seems somewhat exaggerated to single out this insti- 
tution as the factor responsible for overborrowing. 
Moreover, the model is truly more representative of a less developed coun- 
try: no primary securities, equity concentrated in families, no bond market, 
and so on. It takes a great leap of faith to use the case of the pound sterling’s 
departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism for empirical support. In the 
model, the fiscal deficit is money financed, and the stabilization plan is aimed 
at eliminating this inflation. The model really better fits a Latin American 
country and a less than fully credible EB program. 
Another market imperfection suggested is asymmetric information. This re- 
sults in credit rationing in the model: firms and people are financially con- 
strained in production (working capital) and demand (liquidity). From the fa- 
mous article by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on credit rationing, it is obvious that 
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the interest rate because the interest rate not only conveys information on rela- 
tive scarcities but also on different qualities of borrowers. If for a given interest 
rate a risk-neutral borrower is indifferent between two projects, an increase in 
the interest rate will make him prefer the riskier project, the project with the 
higher probability of bankruptcy. As the expected return to the bank in that 
case is lower, credit rationing occurs. It is not clear from the model why banks 
should increase loans without taking into account the effects of this increase 
on the expected return to the loans. The model really needs much more struc- 
ture here so as to take into account how banks use the interest rates they charge 
to sort potential borrowers and affect the actions of borrowers. There are inter- 
est rates in this case that equate supply and demand, but they are not equilib- 
rium ones. 
If credit rationing occurs instead because of interest rate ceilings on lending 
institutions, then interest rates are below the equilibrium levels. Notice that in 
this case of credit rationing the interest rate that equates supply and demand is 
most likely to be an equilibrium interest rate. The distinction between these 
cases seems to me very important. Again the model really needs to much more 
explicitly identify the source of the financial market inefficiency. 
Finally, the real deposit rate rises in the internationally liberalized economy 
because the elimination of the fiscal deficit reduces the need to extract financ- 
ing from the banking system. The abolition of reserve requirements eliminates 
the wedge between deposit and lending rates and thus allows deposit rates to 
rise even when the lending rate is falling. This policy shock should also be 
made explicit in the model. Presumably, in a dynamic discussion these effects 
should be made explicit. Otherwise, there is tension in the model as the in- 
crease in net foreign official reserves via the capital inflow becomes exogenous 
to the model (although it is endogenous in the discussion). 
Banks are special. However, the behavior of the banking industry, especially 
its demand for reserves, is not modeled explicitly in the uncertainty environ- 
ment suggested in the paper. 
Some Necessary Features of a Dynamic Model of Reform and 
Stabilization 
The equilibrium real exchange rate. In a fully credible stabilization and reform 
program, the equilibrium real exchange rate is not likely to remain constant: 
both commercial policy and capital controls affect its equilibrium level. Simi- 
larly, because many successful fiscal reforms require a change in the composi- 
tion of government expenditures-not  only a change in their share in GDP- 
they will also affect the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
Trade  liberalization  makes  available  new  investment  opportunities and 
allows not only a move along the production possibility frontier but also access 
to a new technology. This is another source of change of the equilibrium real 
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Banks’ supply offunds. In the model, the exchange rate peg is believed to hold 
into the indefinite future. The authorities are said to be forced to control their 
policy instrument, the narrow money supply, so as to keep the domestic nomi- 
nal  interest rate  consistent with  uncovered interest parity.  Notice  that  the 
money supply measure should not be considered a policy instrument because, 
in a truly fixed exchange rate system such as the one assumed in the paper, 
the stock of the money supply is endogenously determined by  the balance of 
payments. The central bank passively purchases and sells foreign exchange at 
the pegged rate. If the foreign currency is purchased from banks, as is assumed 
here, those banks will find themselves with enlarged holdings of  domestic 
monetary reserves, which will induce an expansion of  the country’s money 
stock. This capital inflow should be modeled which will require more structure 
to explain banks’ supply of funds. 
Expectations. The issue of  how  expectations are modeled also seems im- 
portant. If some backward price indexing exists, or if rigidities such as nonsyn- 
chronized price setting are highlighted, then there is likely to be a group of 
agents who have extrapolative and destabilizing expectations as they forecast 
for shorter periods. Those forecasting for longer planning horizons tend to have 
stabilizing expectations instead. This has been shown to matter for the dynam- 
ics of the system, for example, in a simulation of the effects of financial liberal- 
ization of the Italian economy by Gandolfo and Padoan (1990). 
In  McKinnon and Pill’s  paper, adequate modeling of  expectations could 
show that less than perfect credibility results from agents’ anticipating that 
capital account liberalization without domestic financial market reforms is 
bound to lead the economy into an explosive path. 
Conclusions 
I agree that capital market imperfections, asymmetric information, and the 
like, are present in most if not all of the countries that undertook stabilization 
programs. The fact that the boom-bust cycle is related to both a capital account 
surplus and a current account deficit seems to me, however, to point to causes 
other than those suggested in the paper. A most fundamental force must explain 
these phenomena. I suggest that most stabilization programs seem to run into 
a basic sustainability syndrome motivated by dynamic inconsistency. 
Credibility of the reform process is essential, in particular for the well func- 
tioning of domestic financial markets. However, credibility takes time to build. 
Credibility requires two elements. First, the overdl program must be feasible, 
not just the fiscal adjustment. Second, policy commitments must not be subject 
to a time inconsistency problem. Simple and not excessively state-contingent 
rules are to be preferred to discretion. Tying the hands of policymakers guaran- 
tees that a better equilibrium ensues. This can be done by introducing a series 
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change in regime is going to take place raises the political cost of policy rever- 
sals and thereby promotes credibility. This is an internal political constraint. 
Second, effective checks on the various branches of the policy-making appara- 
tus, such as creating an independent central bank or introducing the legal pro- 
hibition of deficit monetization, increase the credibility of reform. These are 
internal legal constraints. External legal constraints such as the prohibition on 
quotas or increases in bound tariffs in WTO also raise the credibility of  the 
reform. Finally, external economic constraints such as adopting an economic 
program supported by a multilateral agency also provide credibility to the re- 
form. It is suspected, however, that none of  these measures, even  not all of 
them adopted simultaneously, are likely to be a perfect substitute for the actual 
path followed by the reform process. 
Trade liberalization demonopolizes the economy and improves the alloca- 
tion of resources by  better price signaling. However, adjustment requires the 
use of credit. Without access to the credit market, even sound projects will not 
be undertaken, and sound firms may go out of the market. Thus current account 
convertibility requires a functioning financial system. It is clear that the quality 
of money and capital markets influences the benefits that can be obtained from 
real-sector reform. Trade liberalization also requires some capital inflows to 
finance the adjustment costs as well. However, capital inflows are not a substi- 
tute for fiscal reform as they appreciate the exchange rate and offset the depre- 
ciation of the equilibrium real exchange rate that is likely to result from trade 
liberalization. But a successful fiscal reform is just the beginning of a lengthy 
process aiming at a lasting change of market participant expectations. 
In  the literature about the sequencing of reforms it has already been sug- 
gested that domestic financial market reform must be undertaken before any 
liberalization of the capital account is attempted. McKinnon has also argued 
this in the past. From this point of view, the paper does not add much new. 
After living for 25 years in a country which is a textbook case of unsound 
macroeconomic policy  and  failed  stabilization programs,  I remain uncon- 
vinced by the “overborrowing syndrome” hypothesis. 
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Comment  Chong-Hyun Nam 
McKinnon and Pill have written an excellent paper that is full of insights and 
provides very useful messages to policymakers in both developing and devel- 
oped nations. The paper is especially interesting to me because Korea is cur- 
rently involved in liberalizing its capital account, and the possibility of exces- 
sive capital inflow has recently become an acute issue. 
The highlight of McKinnon and Pill’s paper is the demonstration of why and 
how  some economic reform programs can lead to excessive capital inflows 
when the capital account is open. For that, the paper provides models as well 
as some factual evidence. The paper also examines the effects of a country’s 
trade reform on its investment and saving patterns, using a Fisherian type of 
model. Finally, the paper suggests some policy prescriptions to mitigate poten- 
tial damage due to overborrowing. 
I have two major comments on the paper: one is on the relevancy to reality 
of the Fisherian type of  model, and the other concerns the practicality of the 
policy prescriptions suggested. Both comments will be made in the light of 
Korean experiences. 
First, using a Fisherian two-period model, the paper shows that some real- 
side reforms, such as trade reform, can raise income and consumption in both 
periods when the capital market is open, and more important, it shows that 
domestic private saving could fall sharply as a consequence. Indeed, the Mexi- 
can experience seems to confirm this argument. As  shown in table 1.1, the 
private saving rate in Mexico declined sharply from 15.5 to 7.7 percent in the 
three-year period following an economic reform plan put into action in 1989. 
This drop was  accompanied by  a sharp rise in foreign capital inflow which 
took place during the same period as shown in table 1.3. 
It seems, however, that the Korean experience provides a contrasting case. 
The Korean economy, for instance, underwent a rapid liberalization period 
during the 1980s on almost all fronts, real as well as financial. Following a 
view generally held by economists on sequencing of economic liberalization, 
Korea undertook trade reform first and pursued it much more quickly and more 
extensively than financial reform. In particular, a very conservative step-by- 
step approach was taken toward the liberalization of the capital account of  the 
balance of payments. Nonetheless, steady and significant progress was made 
in opening up the capital account during the 1980s. 
An important consequence of all of  these liberalization efforts undertaken 
in Korea may be found in a rapid rise in both income and the domestic saving 
rate: between 1981 and 1991, real income grew at an annual rate of nearly 10 
percent, and the domestic saving rate rose to greater than 36 percent from less 
than 22 percent. 
An  interesting question then is, Why is Korea’s saving pattern so different 
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from Mexico’s? McKinnon and Pill may argue that Korea’s capital account had 
been less open than Mexico’s, That may have some truth in it. But I have a 
couple of  other hunches.  One is that the domestic saving rate may  depend 
much more on income level and its growth rate than on the domestic real inter- 
est rate. In fact, many econometricians, including Nam (1988), seem to support 
this view, at least when the Korean economy is concerned. My other hunch 
has to do with the role of the real exchange rate, in that an overvalued currency 
can encourage consumption of imported goods and may lead to less domestic 
savings. I do not know much about the Mexican experience with real exchange 
rates, but I do know that Korea has been rather successful in maintaining a 
stable real exchange rate over time at a realistic level (Nam 1995). So I wonder 
what different results McKinnon and Pill’s model would produce if modifica- 
tions were made so that saving or consumption is a function of real income 
rather than of real interest rate. 
Now let me turn to the policy recommendation part of the paper. I fully share 
McKinnon and Pill’s view that the potential damage due to overborrowing can 
be real when economic reform plans are implemented with the capital account 
open or the capital account being opened up simultaneously. In that case, there- 
fore, some kind of safeguards or precautionary measures may be needed. 
For that purpose, McKinnon and Pill suggest a list of do’s and don’t’s,  such 
as restricting consumer access to credits, restraining short-term capital flow 
itself, and setting up a system something like Singapore’s provident fund. I 
think these measures may be of help in mitigating the potential damage, but 
I wonder whether these measures are workable. I also wonder whether such 
compulsory measures as suggested above can be consistent with the concept 
of economic liberalization. It is quite conceivable that these measures may also 
produce undesirable side effects. 
In any case, I think it would be better to take a gradual approach to opening 
up the capital account, controlling the speed and scope. But I am not sure how 
much “gradualness” would be optimal. I recall that Robert Mundell (1992) 
recently came to Korea and expressed his views on the Korean case. He sug- 
gested that Korea, with a saving rate already over 35 percent, can afford to 
forget entirely about relying on foreign capital for its economic development. 
This is certainly an another extreme view. 
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